WELCOME TO THE JUNGLE: THE PROBLEM OF LANGUAGE
write about a supposed influence of one thinker on another seems more a task for the humanities than it does for philosophy. To repeat, while points of comparison may surface in what follows, my central purpose is not to compare these two writers.Î n keeping with the idea of a thought experiment, my aim is to attempt to think with the seminal chiefs concerning the problem of language. I shall endeavor to clear a path through the jungle by taking the writings of Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard as my starting point. Yet this is only one path, I suspect that many more are possible, and some may be clearer and some more trodden than others. Wittgenstein writes in the Philosophical Investigations that "language is a labyrinth of many paths. '* The reader and interpreter do well to keep this in mind, for one can easily get lost in the jungle of Wittgensteinian aphorisms and Kierkegaardian pseudonyms.
The broad conception of the question which this paper is concerned with answering is: Is there a solution to the problem of language? Before one can approach this question, however, the problem of language itself must be understood and made plain. For it is only through clarifying what the problem of language is that a satisfactory solution may be found. The importance of thinking with Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard is that they are the recognized sowers of the weighty thoughts that follow tfiem. This, then, constitutes the focus of my paper.
I think it will be easily conceded that the problem of language is taken to heart by both Kierkegaard While the answer we read in the Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus is fundamentally different than the one given in the later Philosophical Investigations -the one I shall priviledge in this paper-the big picture remains the same. A sketch of the big picture shows the world set against language with the problem pointing to where one would expect to find the relation between language and the world. Provided that there is a relationship between language and the world, the question then becomes: How can one understand this relationship?
That which serves as the relation between language and the world is that which needs to be understood in order to solve the problem of language in Wittgenstein. Put briefly, the wonderful answer is: language-games. What, then, is a language-game and how does it link language to reality? It sounds so simple. Is this too good to be true? In what follows I shall attempt to, albeit much too hastily, sketch Wittgenstein's development of the notion of a language-game and interpret its importance for his later philosophy.
In notes dictated to his class in Cambridge during 1933-34, known as The Blue Book, Wittgenstein tells us that language games "are ways of using signs simpler than those in which we use the signs of our highly complicated everyday language. "^ The example he gives involves the use of words, which is one case of operating with signs. At this stage he does not attempt to answer the general question, "What are signs?" This might lead one to think that a language game could be possible without the use of words. It seems, however, that this is not the case, for Wittgenstein explains that, "language games are the forms of language with which a child begins to make use WriTGENSTElN: The Blue and Brown Books, Oxford, 1958, p. 17. of words. "'^ In studying simple forms of language we also find activities, gestures, and reactions which can be built upon to make more complicated forms of language, such as our everyday language.
In the beginning of the notes dictated during 1934-35, known as The Brown Book, we Hnd a more detailed example of how language games are to be understood. Here too the example of a language game includes words, which are names of things or numerals taught demonstratively, gestures, questions, and answers. This example goes to show that language games are "complete in themselves, as systems ofhurrum communication"^r egardless how primitive or simple they may be. Furthermore, it is only by understanding the whole language game, i.e., all that is involved in a language and its use as an activity, that one can come to an understanding of the meanings of words through understanding their roles played in a language game.^^ From this it follows that the relation of the name of an object to the object itself is constituted by "the whole of the usage of the name in a language game."'' Finally, the notion of a language-game is more fully discussed in the Philosophical Investigations. Here Wittgenstein straighforwardly states that "the term 'languagegame' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. "'* What is more important for understanding the problem of language, however, is that in these later investigations we find the frequently discussed problem of a private language. This is TOPICOS closely related to the puzzle of solipsism, and in interpreting Wittgenstein, one can argue that the basic reason for Wittgenstein's rejection of the possibility of a private language is the necessary publicity of language-games. While Wittgenstein does not see the concept of language-game as having a definable essence, it is nonetheless characterized by the capacity to be publicly understood. ere we see that if the individual solipsist's experience of reality, i.e., the world of immediacy, is to be expressed, it must be done so through a common medium. This medium is a language-game. The question then becomes: Is the immediate, private experience somehow contained within its expession in a ianguage-game? Or, is it lost the moment it gets expressed in language? ' strikes me in this passage is the interesting statement that "the real purpose" of the 'private language argument', and hence language-games which serve as the basis for the 'private language argument', is considered to be a "neat trick." I take it that here 'trick' is not meant in its primary sense of a deception, cheat, ruse, or treachery, but instead, in its minor sense of a knack or a method or process of doing something successfully. I bring this out not to question the authors' choice of words, but rather, to show a point worthy of philosophical debate. On one interpretation Wittgenstein's central notion of language-game serves as the basic link between reality and language. This is the understanding of 'trick' in its minor sense, which means we can successfully express our immediate, private experiences by playing a language-game that forms the basic semantical relationship between language and the world. This is to say, our immediate experiences are somehow contained within our ' ^Â n opposing interpretation, understanding 'trick' in its primary sense, is that the notion of language-game is a deception. We simply cannot express our immediate experiences in language, and we still are without a clear understandable link between language and reality. Contrary to what Wittgenstein wrote in this letter mentioned above everything gets lost when we speak. Language-games are deceptive and, maybe, dangerous when understood as the wonder cure to the problem of language. I turn now to Kierkegaard, no stranger to deception.
In Kierkegaard's first pseudonymous work, Either/Or, the first 'proper' essay following the "Preface" and the "Diapsalmata" is entitled "The Immediate Stages of the Erotic or the Musical Erotic." Here we find a characterization of language as well as an attempt to stretch the limits of language to describe a musical piece, i.e., Mozart's Don Juan. By contrast, Wittgenstein writes in Zettel that "understanding a musical phrase may also be called understanding a language." We must be careful here, however. This simply means that hearing a sentence and hearing a musical phrase are comparable, as the media of language and music both address the ear. This does not, however, mean that the thinking of a sentence is comparable to the singing of a musical score.^^ Certainly it is not.
Kierkegaard, under the persona of 'A', the aesthete, sharpens the distinction between music and language. Music is the proper medium through which immediacy can be expressed; language cannot express immediacy. But why is this? It is because language is 'the house of thought' and involves refiection. "Refiection", Kierkegaard writes, "destroys the immediate, and hence it is impossible to express the musical
